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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  literature  provides  evidence  that  the  capital  structure  of  a  firm  is  often  a 
combination  of  several  securities;  it  can  arrange  (1)  Bank  loan  (2)  issue 
debentures/bonds, (3) issue shares (4) lease financing, or (5) utilise its retained earnings. 
Eventually  number  of  ideas  and  theories  has  been  developed  to  discuss  the  optimal 
capital  structure.  Optimum  is  the  trade-off  between  the  benefit  of  tax  and  costs  of 
financial distress; a firm faces due to the borrowed money. Although extensive research 
work has been done on the capital structure but still it remains one of the unsettled topics 
in  finance.  Optimal  capital  structure  has  an  impact  on  corporate  profits.  Debt  is 
considered as the cheapest source of financing due to tax shield, higher the firm’s tax 
bracket more the debt is advantageous to a firm. The trade off theory states that higher 
debt is associated with higher profitability.  Three reasons support this theory; one debt 
allow tax shield. Second, more trust is built on profitable companies considering more 
sustainable and less prone to bankruptcy; hence high profitable companies are able to 
seek  more  debt.   Third,  agency  cost,  for  the  profitable  firms,  lenders/creditors  give 
relaxation in monitoring charges, which reduces the debt cost. This motivates profitable 
firms to go for more debt.  
If  firms  follow  pecking  order  theory  then  it  base  financial  decision  on  the 
availability  of  internally  generated  funds.  Profitable  firms  prefer  internal  financing. 
External finance is only used when internally generated funds are not sufficient.  
Number of studies worldwide shows different results. Textile industry is the 
largest sector of Pakistan, which has major share in exports. Hence this sector has a 
major impact on the national economy. This sector major financing depend on bank 
loan. In mid 1990s Government of Pakistan started financial sector reforms and in 
1997 it was strengthened when the government issued three amended ordinances that 
are,  State  Bank  of  Pakistan  Act,  1956,  Banking  Companies  Ordinance,  1962,  and 
Banks Nationalisation  Act,  1974.   These amended  ordinances further  strengthened 
the State Bank of Pakistan in regulating banking sector. Furthermore, Securities and 
Exchange  Commission  of  Pakistan  (SECP)  was  established  under  the  Act  of 
Parliament in 1997 as an autonomous body. It started operations from January 1999 
as regulator of Non-banking financial institutions. This study examines the debt and 
its determinants in the light of capital structure theories in the pre and post financial 
sector reforms.   
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
Capital Structure Theories 
Static trade off theory: Finance managers often think of the firm’s debt-equity 
decision as a trade off between interest tax shield and the cost of financial distress.  Trade 
off theory of capital structure recognises that target debt ratios may vary from industry to 
industry. Industries where assets are mostly tangible, borrow heavily because their assets 
are  collateral  and  relatively  safe,  however,  the  trade  off  capital  structure  advocates 
moderate debt ratio. 
Rajan  and  Zingales (1995)  compared  leverage  and  its determinates  across G-7 
countries  that  are  united  states,  Germany,  Canada,  Italy,  France,  Japan  and  united 
kingdom. They analysed there was a positive relationship of leverage and profitability 
only in Germany. Tangibility is positively correlated in all countries. Size is positively 
correlated with leverage except Germany.  
Jose ( n.d.) have studied the relationship between capital structure and profitability 
of  the  Brazilian  firms.   They  have  concluded  that  in  short  run  there  was  a  positive 
relationship between debt and profitability.  However, in the long urn there was inverse 
relationship between debt and profitability.    
Antonoiu,  Guney,  and  Paudyal  (2002)  investigated  determinants  of  capital 
structure and leverage ratio of French, German and British firms with the help of penal 
data. Their results suggested that size of the firm positively affect the leverage ratio. They 
analyse relation of profitability, size of firms, fixed assets. This study identifies a positive 
impact on firm’s size on leverage. While the relationship between fixed asset ratio and 
level of leverage was mixed means positive in Germany but negative in France and UK. 
This shows that tangibility of assets is more significant in bank borrowing in Germany. 
The effect of all these factors on leverage depends on financial environment and tradition 
of the country in which firm operates.  
Frank and Vidhan (2005) investigated that there are a large number of variables 
that appear to be related to debt ratio of the firm but only few factors have significant 
effect  on  debt  ratio.  They  found  that  relation  between  leverage  and  size  of  firm  is 
positive.  For  tangibility of  assets Empirical results showed  a positive relation  among 
leverage and tangibility of assets of firm.  
On  the  basis  above  literature  review  on  static  trade  off  theory,  following 
hypothesis can be developed and tested whether static trade off theory is relevant in 
Pakistan textile sector. 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between leverage ratios and profitability. 
H2:  There is positive relationship between leverage ratios and tangibility. 
H3:  There is positive relationship between leverage rations and size.   
Pecking Order Theory 
Asymmetric information affects the choice between internal and external financing 
and between new issues of debt and equity securities, this lead to pecking order theory.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggested that retained earning is better than debt but on the 
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should have inverse relationship with leverage. Managers use private information about 
the characteristics of firm’s return on investment or investment opportunities which is not 
known to common investors. 
Antonios,  Guney,  and  Paudyal  (2002)  investigated  determinants  of  capital 
structure and leverage ratio of French, German and British firms with the help of penal 
data. This study identifies a positive impact on firm’s size on leverage. They also find an 
inverse  relationship  among  profitability  and  leverage  only  in  France  and  UK,  which 
supports pecking order theory in these countries. While the relationship between fixed 
asset ratio and level of leverage was mixed means positive in Germany but negative in 
France  and  UK.  This  shows  that  tangibility  of  assets  is  more  significant  in  bank 
borrowing in Germany. The effect of all these factors on leverage depends on financial 
environment and tradition of the country in which firm operates.  
Frank and Vidhan (2005) found that relation between leverage and size of firm is 
positive.  For  tangibility  of  assets  empirical  results  showed  a  positive  relation  among 
leverage and tangibility of assets of firm. The results showed a negative relation between 
profitability and leverage.  
Hijazi  and  Tariq  (2006)  analysed  determinants  of  capital  structure  of  cement 
industry of Pakistan with the help of OLS regression. They found that size of firms and 
profitability were negatively correlated with leverage. Hence this rejects the static trade 
off theory, which showed a positive relation between size of the firm and profitability. 
This shows that firms in cement industry use more equity and less debt. Tangibility of 
assets and growth found to be positively correlated with leverage. All the results were 
significant except the size of the firm. Their results with Shah   and Hijazi (2005) were 
found to be different in terms of growth and size of the firm. They concluded that in 
developing  countries  like  Pakistan,  cement  industry  usage  of  short  term  financing  is 
higher than long term financing.  
Spuma, Waters, and Payne (1995) concerned with those variables that indicate the 
level of leverage in firm. It shows that there is a negative relation among growth and 
leverage of the firm. Size of the firm is negatively correlated with the leverage of the firm 
hence smaller firms are accepted to increase the profitability of going private. 
Scot  (1976) stated that firm will issue secured debt to the possible extent in order 
to attain the optimal capital structure. He argues the agency costs of secured debt as lower 
as compared to unsecured debt. Thus, firms with fixed assets issue more debt.  
Keister (2000) stated that in the economic transition times, shortage of finance in 
companies affect the capital structure of companies.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) argues that size has an affect on financial leverage 
across countries. Research carried out on U.S. U.K, Japan, France, and Israel data. It 
concluded that there was more variation in financial leverage across countries.  
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) highlighted the affect of macroeconomic conditions 
and firm specific factors and stated that both have an effect on firms financing choices.  
Antonios, et al. (2002) argued that surrounding environment has impact on the 
capital structure decisions of firms besides it own characteristics. There may be different 
reasons; the environment affects the company’s capital structure like  the improvement in 
the state of economy, the existence of a stock market and/or the size of banks sector. 
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securities. Leverage can also be changed when the firms circumstances changes or when 
its stock prices changes.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) concluded profitability is negatively correlated in 
all G-7 countries except Germany and analysed that size is positively correlated with 
leverage  except  Germany.  Tangiblity  is  positively  correlated  with  leverage  in  all 
countries. 
Wolfgang and Fix (2003) concluded that firms with less investment opportunities 
apply more leverage that is in  accordance to  both  theories and  leverage has a direct 
relation with the tangibility of assets. They also suggest that more profitable firms use 
less leverage.  
On  the  basis  of  above  literature  review  on  Pecking  order  theory,  following 
hypothesis  can  be  developed  and  tested  whether  Pecking  order  theory  is  relevant  in 
Pakistan textile sector.  
H4:  There is a negative relationship between leverage ratios and profitability. 
H5:  There is positive relationship between leverage ratios and tangibility. 
H6:  There is positive relationship between leverage rations and growth.   
3.  METHODOLOGY  
Data 
The data used in empirical analysis are sourced from the State Bank of Pakistan 
Publications “Balance Sheet Analysis of Listed companies on KSE” for the period from 
1995 to 2004 (10 years), 176 firms from textile industry included in this analysis.    
Model Specification 
Most of the studies used OLS model for analysis but this model has very strong 
assumption of constant intercept and slope coefficients.  In this study Fixed effect model 
has been used on a panel data set considering different intercepts for different companies 
to capture firm’s special features. Time dummies have not been used as there is only one 
industry, time effects during this period were common for all firms.  











1    
Where:  
it Y  = Leverage ratio of individual firm over time.  
it X  = Independent  variables  (as  mentioned  below)  of  individual  firms  over  the 
time.  
i D  = Dummy for each company.  
MRD = Market Reform Dummy.  
it
 
= Residual of individual firm over the time. Corporate Debt Policy   469
Leverage (Dependent Variables) 
Academic  literature  suggests  various  definitions  of  leverage.  Finance  literature 
give more recognition to the debt ratio, defined as the ratio of total debt divided by the 
total assets of the firm.   Rajan and Zingales (1995) defines of leverage as “the ratio of 
debt to total assets.” This study uses leverage as defined as used by Rajan in his study. 
Leverage= Total Debt/ Total Assets  
Independent Variables  
Profitability 
Profitability is important determinant of business performance. Managers have to 
put efforts to earn profit to pay off business liabilities and provide return to owners and 
expand business. Static trade off theory and pecking order theory consider profitability as 
one of the determinants of debt of a company. Literature provides the ratio of profitability 
as profit after taxed to the book value of total assets; the same is used in this study. 
Profitability = NPAT / Total Assets.  
Size 
Static trade off theory establishes a direct link of the size of the firm to debt of a 
company. Small size companies are normally closely held and company information is 
asymmetry where as large companies have dispersed ownership and more exposed to 
public. Being information symmetry, large companies can raise debt from public more 
easily  and  can  reduce  transaction  costs  associated  with  debt  issuance.  In  this  way 
leverage of larger firms is more. Literature provides the evidence of using Log of sales as 
measure of size of firms.  
Size = LN (total sales)   
Tangibility of Assets 
Static trade off theory and Pecking order theory make link between tangible assets 
and  debt.  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1995)  states  “Tangibility  of  assets  is  an  important 
determinant of leverage” On this analogy companies having more tangible assets have the 
greater ability to take debt as compared to smaller companies. Lender considers secure in 
dealing with companies having more tangible assets.  
Tangibility of Assets = Fixed Assets / Total Assets   
Analysis  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows that on average this industry finance 82 percent of its assets through 
debt with the variation of 43 percent that means in some cases its debt is more than 
assets.  Profitability shows on average industry earned nothing as a return to its investors 
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shows  on  average,  the  industry  in  the  last  ten  years  earned  nothing  rather  generated 
losses. Equity financing on average in this industry is 18 percent. Growth on average 
found  to be 15  percent with a variation  of  92  percent. This shows high volatility in 
growth. Tangible assets on average in this industry are 59 percent with the variation of 20 
percent. This percentage seems reasonable for this industry.     
The industry must realise that the cost associated to debt is the reason of financial 
distress. This cost of distress increases when firm uses more debt and is unable to meet 
interest and principle payments.   
Table1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Period 1995-2004 
Variables  Observations
 
Mean  SD  Minimum  Maximum 
Leverage  1760  0.82  0.43  0            4.79* 
Tangible Assets  1760  0.59  0.20  0  1.0 
Size (LN Sales)  1760  6.20  1.40  –1.6  10.6 
Growth  1760  0.15  0.92  –0.99  13.89 
Profitability  1760  0.00  0.15  –1.87  1.51 
Note: * Theoretically, debt ratio should be less than one or equal to one, but we have find that most of the firms 
have negative equity that shows why ratio is more than one.  
          As can be seen from Table 2, the independent variables provide reasonable 
explanatory  power    as  indicated  by  R-square  value  0.61.  Although  market  reform 
dummy coefficient is weak positive but is statistically significant that shows financial 
market reforms have improved the worse situation but as this sector is badly suffering 
from financial distress, it needs more intra firm management efforts. Firm specific effect 
has been found in analysis as evident from t-value of dummies coefficient.  If static trade 
off  theory  holds,  significant  positive  slope  coefficients  are  expected  for  profitability, 
tangibility and size explanatory variables.   Analysis evidences that there is significant 
negative  slope coefficient  of  profitability,  size  but  positive  slope  coefficient  only  for 
tangibility of assets. There is no support for static trade off theory from textile sector of 
Pakistan.  
If  pecking  order  theory  holds,  significant  negative  slope  coefficient  for 
profitability is expected and significant positive slope coefficients for growth and 
tangibility are expected.   Analysis show the significant negative slope coefficient 
for profitability and significant positive slope coefficient for tangibility as expect 
by  theory  but  significant  negative  slope  coefficient  for  growth  against  the 
theoretical  expectations.   There  is  some  support  for  pecking  order  theory  from 
textile  sector  of  Pakistan.   The  expected  and  observed  relationships  have  been 
shown at Tables 3 and 4. Corporate Debt Policy   471
Table 2 
Fixed Effect (Ordinary Least Square Dummy Variable) Model 
No. of Observations  1754 
R-squared  0.61 
Adjusted R-squared  0.58 
F(117,1636)=22.10  Prob>F=0.0000  
Variables  Coefficient  t-value  P-value 
Tangible Assets  .5755544  11.58  0.000 
Size Ln(Sales)  –.0625018  –8.99  0.000 
Growth  –.0173403  –2.30  0.021 
Profitability  –2775967  –5.60  0.000 
Market Reform Dummy  .039492  2.89  0.004 
D1       .6121978  6.77  0.000 
D2  –.1461853  –1.62  0.104 
D3  –2719628  –3.04  0.002 
D4  .3592083  4.0  0.00 
D5  .0725621  0.81  0.420 
D6  .22967  2.54  0.011 
D7  –3085304  –3.43  0.001 
D8  –4169538  –4.60  0.000 
D9  .673009  7.54  0.000 
D10  –0542212  –0.61  0.544 
D11  1.586824  17.62  0.000 
D12  .0847772  0.95  0.343 
D13  –.2904446  –3.24  0.001 
D14  –.5024548  –5.53  0.000 
D15  –.0315122  –0.35  0.725 
D16  –.0032141  –0.04  0.972 
D17  .0165131  0.18  0.853 
D18  –.0514177  –0.58  0.565 
D19  –.0932618  –1.04  0.297 
D20  –.0932618  –1.04  0.297 
D21  –.0044418  –0.05  0.960 
D22  –.0535924  –0.60  0.549 
D23  .0249744  0.28  0.781 
D24  –.1028614  –1.15  0.249 
D25  –.0245935  –0.27  0.785 
D26  .2578112  2.85  0.004 
D27  .1141909  1.28  0.202 
D28  1.306758  14.54  0.000 
D29  –.1170848  –1.31  0.190 
D30  –.312008  –3.48  0.001 
D31  –.3085768  –3.26  0.001 
D32  –.2292413  –2.65  0.008 
D33  .1259899  1.32  0.187 
D34  –.2224344  –2.46  0.014 
D35  .1139825  1.28  0.201 
D36  .2240508  2.51  0.012 
D37  –.3614189  –3.96  0.000 
D38  .1360947  1.49  0.137 
D39  .2322271  2.56  0.011 
D40  .1431146  1.58  0.115 
D41  .1431146  1.58  0.115 
D42  –.0718734  –0.80  0.422 
D43  .411755  4.56  0.000 
D44  .0961656  1.07  0.283 
D45  –.2093553  –2.34  0.019 
D46  –.2093553  -2.34  0.019 
D47  –.2093553  –2.34  0.019 
D48  .2654228  2.71  0.007 
D49  .3008151  3.30  0.001 
D50  .2528208  2.80  0.005 
D51  –.2118971  –2.37  0.018 
D52  .0286508  0.32  0.749 
D53  –.0076215  –0.08  0.932 
D54  –.1578637  –1.75  0.081 
D55  –.269576  –2.98  0.003 
Cons  0.8079151  14.07  0.00 S. M. Amir Shah   472
Table 3 
Expected and Observed Relationship between the Variables,  










Profitability  Positive  Negative  Significant 
Tangibility   Positive  Positive  Significant 
Size LN (Sales)  Positive  Negative  Significant 
 
Table 4 
Expected and Observed Relationship between the Variables,  










Profitability  Negative  Negative  Significant 
Tangibility   Positive  Positive  Significant 
Growth  Positive  Negative  Significant 
 
Theoretically, all companies are exposed to certain risk attached to its operations; 
this  type  of  risk  is  known  as  business  risk  which  remains  the  concern  of  lenders.  
Financial risk is associated with the use of debt by companies. Business risk depends on 
number of factors as stated by Brigham, Gapenski in his book Financial Management 
“(1) demand for firm’s product (2) sales price variability—firm’s product are exposed to 
highly volatile market (3) input cost variability—firm’s input costs are highly uncertain 
(4) ability to adjust output prices for changes in input costs (5) ability to develop new 
product in a timely, cost effective manner—the faster the product become obsolete, the 
greater a firm’s business risk. (6) The extent to which costs are fixed-operating leverage.”  
Bradley,  Jarrell  and  Kim,  (1984)  argue  that  “business  risk  of  the  firm  reflects  the 
probability that the firm will go into bankruptcy, with an inverse relationship between the 
level of business risk of the firm and its leverage”  Proxies are usually used to reflect the 
firm's business risk. Titman and Wessels (1988) uses “standard deviation of the percentage 
change in operating income” Wiwattanakantang (1999) uses “standard deviation of the 
first difference in sales, scaled by the average value of the firm’s total assets” Financial 
risk further increases the risk level of firm if it is exposed to debt financing.  Upon review 
of literature it revealed that the operating profits and return on equity of levered firm will 
decrease  either  due  to  decrease  in  sales  or  increase  in  operating  expenses,  more  as 
compared  to  unlevelled  firm.  Financial  risk  leads  to  financial  distress.  In  times  the 
company  is  in  financial  distress  it  cannot  fulfil  promises  to  creditor,  hence  financial 
distress may leads to bankruptcy, may be lower capital investment and Research and 
Development spending, key employees leave companies. Following calculations depicts 
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Table 5 














Assets  Leverage 
Average  1102.32  1.08  46.09  0.00  0.82 
Standard Deviation  448.8  0.56  119.32  0.16  0.43 
(*) Data did not allow the separation of operating expenses from CGS.  
If we look at Table 5, the average and standard deviation of ROA, Percentage 
change  in  sales  and  operating  expense  (including  cost  of  goods  sold)  to  gross  sales, 
industrial units are not capable of seeking loan either from bank or market, up to the 
extent of 82 percent, in some cases even more than that. Despite inefficient utilisation of 
debt, how it became possible?  For that matter, it is necessary to further explore the ways 
and means of possibility of seeking loan.  Upon review of literature of financial markets 
it  revelled  that  all  borrowing  is  from banks.   In  seventies,  government’s  decision  of 
nationalisation  of  Pakistan’s  banking  sector  strengthened  and  helped  political  control 
upon the financial institutions. State Bank of Pakistan’s regulatory and supervisory role 
was weaker.   Pakistan Banking Council created for operational control of banks. In this 
scenario Federal government had the right to select the members of the Pakistan Banking 
Council (PBC) and through the PBC, it controlled over the formation of BOD through 
nominating board members of individual banks. In this way political control over the 
banking sector was strengthened. In Pakistan industrialists and land lards have strong 
political influence.   Cheema (1999) argues that “during the 1980s and early 1990s the 
rate of  interest on  long-term loans was only 40  percent of  the open  market price of 
capital, which constituted a significant subsidy for the industrial firms.” Subsidised credit 
created  discrimination  became  hurdle  in  corporate  efficiency.  Government  credit 
subsidies watered down the Pakistani corporation’s need to mobilise equity finance and 
debt through capital markets which in turn might be the reason for underdevelopment of 
capital markets in Pakistan. 
In mid 1990s Government of Pakistan started financial sector reforms and in 1997 
it was strengthened when the government issued three amended ordinances that are, State 
Bank  of  Pakistan  Act,  1956,  Banking  Companies  Ordinance,  1962,  and  Banks 
Nationalisation  Act,  1974.   These  amended  ordinances  further  strengthened  the  State 
Bank of Pakistan in regulating banking sector. Furthermore, Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) was established under the Act of Parliament in 1997 as 
an  autonomous  body.  It  started  operations  from  January  1999  as  regulator  of  Non- 
banking financial institutions. 
Once it is proved statistically that market reforms have impact on determinants of 
debt  policy,  it  is  considered  pertinent  to  further  investigate  the  determinants  of  debt 
policy in the context of pre and post financial sector reforms separately by each segment 
analysis to pinpoint the variables. Hence data is divided into two groups Pre reform 1995-
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Table 6 
Pre-financial Sector Reforms Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics (1995–1999) 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Leverage  880  82  35  0.01  3.1 
Tangible Assets  880  0.59  0.21  0.04  1.0 
Size-Ln (Sales)  880  6.09  1.19  0.79  9.15 
Growth  880  0.17  1.23  –0.99  13.89 
Profitability  880  –0.027  0.13  –1.66  0.7 
 
Descriptive statistics show industry in badly clutched in debt trap where there is on 
average 81 percent debt ratio with standard deviation of 35 percent. Growth on average is 
only  17  percent  whereas  during  this  period  of  1995-99  industry  sustained  losses  on 
average around 3 percent of total assets.    
Table 7 
Fixed Effect (Ordinary Least Square Dummy Variable) Model 
(1995–1999) 
No. of Observations  880 
R-squared  0.65 
Adjusted R-squared  0.59 
F(117 ,757)=11.81  Prob>F=0.0000  
Variables  Coefficients  t-values 
Tangible  .2965521  4.99 
Size  –.0122982  –1.31 
Growth  –.0127162  –1.98 
Profitability  –.8527885  –11.05 
D1  –.4682897  4.62 
D2  –.0973133         –0.97 
D3  –.2551793  –2.55 
D4  .1626572  1.61 
D5  .1684891  1.68 
D6  .1575624  1.57 
D7  –.2182896  –2.16 
D8  –.3371508  –3.32 
D9  .714361  7.13 
D10  .0107797  0.11 
D11  .7953232  7.86 
D12  .0209118  0.21 
D13  –.2289789  –2.29 
D14  –.2455824  –2.37 
D15  .0256306  0.26 
D16  .0704384  0.70 
D17  .0129102  0.13 
D18  .1330749  1.34 
D19  .0413353  0.41 
D20  .0685582  0.69 
D21  .0248361  0.25 
D22  .2421013  2.41 
Cons   
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Profitability  coefficient  shows  strong  statistically  significant  relationship  and 
explain reasonable portion of debt. Negative coefficient (–0.85) between profitability and 
debt  show  that  debt  increases  when  profitability  decreases  and  85  percent  debt  is 
explained by negative profitability.   This is the worst situation of lending to the textile 
industry.  
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  7,  the  independent  variables  provide  reasonable 
explanatory power as indicated by R-square value 0.65.   Firm specific effect has been 
found in analysis as evident from t-value of dummies coefficient.   If static trade off 
theory  holds,  significant  positive  slope  coefficients  are  expected  for  profitability, 
tangibility and size explanatory variables.   Analysis evidences that there is significant 
negative  slope coefficient  of  profitability,  size  but  positive  slope  coefficient  only  for 
tangibility of assets.     
There  is  no  support  for  static  trade  off  theory  from textile  sector  of  Pakistan. 
However, there is some support for pecking order theory from textile sector of Pakistan.    
Table 8 
Post-fnancial Sector Reforms Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 2000-2004 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Leverage  880  82  0.51  0.04  4.79 
Tangible Assets  880  0.58  0.19  0.06  1.0 
Size-Ln(Sales)  880  6.32  1.54  0.26  10.61 
Growth  880  0.12  0.41  –0.89  8.0 
Profitability  880  0.026  0.17  –1.87  1.51 
 
Descriptive statistics show industry in on average still has 81 percent debt burden 
with standard deviation of 51 percent. Growth on average is only 12 percent whereas 
during this period of 2000-04 industry improved in assets utilisation and earned a profit 
on average around 3 percent of total assets. This improvement may be attributed to the 
financial sector reforms.  
As can be seen from Table 9, tangible assets coefficient shows strong statistically 
significant relationship and explain reasonable portion of debt whereas other independent 
variables size, growth and profitability do not show strong relationship although they are 
statistically significant. Positive coefficient (0.61) between tangible assets and debt show 
that  debt  increases  when  tangible  assets  increase.  Thus  post  reform  period  analysis 
improved in a way that debt shifted its strong negative relationship with profitability to a 
strong positive relationship with tangible assets.    Negative coefficient of profitability 
decreased from 0.85 to 0.23 which changed its strong relationship with debt to weaker 
relationship  with  debt  and  improved  its  weaker  relationship  with  tangible  assets 
(coefficient  0.29)  to  strong  relationship  with  debt  (0.61).   This  improvement  can  be 
attributed to the financial market reforms.       S. M. Amir Shah   476
Table 9 
Fixed Effect (Ordinary Least Square Dummy Variable) Model 
for the Period 2000–2004 
No. of Observations  880 
R-squared  0.74 
Adjusted R-squared  0.70 
F(117 ,761)=18.92  Prob>F=0.0000  
Variables  Coefficients  t-values 
Tangible  .6072086  7.93 
Size  –.0729014  –8.07 
Growth  –.0676245  –2.75 
Profitability  –.234893  –3.9 
D1  .7594282  6.03 
D2  –.1519616  –1.21 
D3  –.1966783  –1.57 
D4  .5764206  4.62 
D5  –.0347829  –0.28 
D6  .2801931  2.20 
D7  –.3466631  –2.77 
D8  –.4007325  –3.16 
D9  .6095784  4.89 
D10  –.1327001  –1.06 
D11  2.327363  18.48 
D12  .1333092  1.07 
D13  –.2799682  –2.24 
D14  –.5598994  –4.45 
D15  –.04957  –0.40 
D16  –.0386119  –0.31 
D17  –.0070227  –0.06 
D18  –.2641527  –2.12 
D19  –.1896903  –1.52 
D20  –.0860582  –0.69 
D21  –.1489243  –1.19 
Cons   
and More  .8894734  10.88 
 
The independent variables provide reasonable explanatory power as indicated by 
R-square value 0.74.  Firm specific effect has been found in analysis as evident from t-
value of dummies coefficient.  If static trade off theory holds, significant positive slope 
coefficients  are  expected  for  profitability,  tangibility  and  size  explanatory  variables.  
Analysis evidences that there is significant negative slope coefficient of profitability, size 
but positive slope coefficient only for tangibility of assets.     Corporate Debt Policy   477
There is no support for static trade off theory from textile sector of Pakistan. But 
there is some support for pecking order theory from textile sector of Pakistan.    
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study contributes towards a better understanding of financing behaviour of 
textile sector of Pakistan in ten years from 1995 to 2004 through investigating the effect 
of pre and post financial market reforms on determinants of corporate debt policy and 
explores the evidences for static trade off theory and Pecking order theory in financing 
decisions  of  Textile  Sector  of  Pakistan.  The  Analysis  depicts,  that  reforms  have 
statistically significant effect on debt policy. Findings of this study contribute towards a 
better understanding of financing behaviour of textile sector of Pakistan in ten years from 
1995 to 2004. During the period of 1995-99 industry sustained losses on average around 
3 percent of total assets whereas during the period of 2000-04 industry improved in assets 
utilisation and earned a profit on average around 3 percent of total assets. The post reform 
period analysis also improved in a way that debt shifted its strong negative relationship 
with  profitability  to  a  strong  positive  relationship  with  tangible  assets.   Negative 
coefficient of profitability decreased from 0.85 to 0.23 which changed its strong negative 
relationship with debt to weaker negative relationship with debt and improved its weaker 
positive relationship with tangible assets (coefficient 0.29) to strong relationship with 
debt  (0.61).  Although  market  reform  dummy  coefficient  is  weak  positive  but  is 
statistically significant that shows financial  market reforms have improved  the worse 
situation but as this sector is badly suffering from financial distress, it needs more intra 
firm management efforts. Results show that on average this industry remained under the 
debt burden of 82 percent of its assets during the whole period of analysis.  This study 
show on average, the industry in the last ten years earned nothing. This study explored 
the evidences for static trade off theory and Pecking order theory.  On the basis of capital 
structure  theories  and  literature  review  of  existing  research  work,  hypothesis  were 
developed and tested.   Analysis gives no support to static trade off theory for textile 
sector  of  Pakistan.  However,  there  is  some  support  for  pecking  order  theory.    The 
industry must realise that the cost associated to debt is the reason of financial distress. 
This cost of distress increases when firm uses more debt and is unable to meet interest 
and principle payments. Analysis show lending was neither professionally granted by 
Banks and development Financial Institutions nor debt was professionally employed in 
the firms. Operating expenses and cost of goods are much higher that is major reasons of 
financial distress. The performance of this sector has a strong impact on the national 
economy. Unless such measures are taken which efficiently utilise the resources, reduce 
the operating expense and cost of good, due success cannot be achieved in the present 
scenario.   
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